French brigade system

I’m sorry, but since the snippet provided already summarizes the main points of the webpage, there is no need to provide an additional set of notes. However, here’s a summarized version of the snippet:

The webpage discusses the reasons behind French military success during the Revolutionary/Napoleonic period. These include effective conscription/revolutionary zeal that allowed France to recruit larger armies compared to its population, poor coordination between various coalition armies, innovations in army organization using the Corps system that allowed larger armies to coordinate and maneuver more quickly, the battlefield skill of Napoleon and his subordinates, and added manpower from French satellite states. The French army was able to march independently using a new system of corps organization, and as a result, they were able to live off of the land and forage for resources. The comments section includes additional insights on the composition and tactics of the French army, the importance of conscription and the role of the Gendarmerie, promotion of talented people from the ranks and/or from the common classes into officer positions, and other factors leading to French military success.

• The French-German Brigade is a brigade-sized unit that has been around for 30 years.
• The brigade has never been fully deployed.
• The post asks why the brigade has not been fully deployed, and whether it is more symbolic than useful.
• One comment suggests that the brigade is a political symbol rather than a fully integrative military unit.
• The strategic cultures of Germany and France are seen as one reason why the brigade has not been fully deployed.
  • France thinks nothing of using military force to support/underpin its foreign policy.
  • In Germany, the military is the very last resort in situations where there is no other alternative.
• France routinely conducts offensive operations whereas the mere idea sends the entire German political landscape scrambling for shelter.
• The President in France can deploy forces and only has to inform the Parliament after the fact.
• In Germany, nothing moves without parliamentary approval.
• France has sought to deploy the Brigade in operations where its own national interests have been touched.
• Germany does not define what its national interests are and when it would consider deploying the Bundeswehr.
• Factually all deployments of the post-Cold War era were political gestures for either Washington or Paris, they were never explained with German national interests.
• Germany always declined to deploy the brigade due to other factors, mostly domestic calculations.
• Postings to the French part of the brigade are considered a career buster.
• One reason for the brigade to still exist given the vastly different political cultures and structures is the unwillingness of both political establishments to shoulder the blame for having ended the experiment.
• Despite the lofty rhetoric about a “European Army” coming out of both capitals both countries are moving further apart.
• The brigade will continue to languish in limbo as a political symbol, sucking up resources and manpower both militaries could do with elsewhere.
• Shutting it down would have symbolic implications, and neither France nor Germany wants to shoulder that blame.

Not used in article

Not used in article

• By VE Day in 1945, the French armed forces in Europe could muster twenty divisions, including three armored divisions and five infantry divisions of the First Army. The rest consisted of second-rate divisions that were formed recently.
• Most of the French military was equipped with American weaponry, such as Sherman tanks and M1917 Enfield rifles.
• US gear was supplemented with what France could produce itself, captured German gear, and French pre-war stocks of weapons like the FM-24.
• The French armed forces were supplied with military aid through the lend-lease of Allied - mostly American - equipment. It allowed France to put a significant number of men and material in the field in 1945, unlike other liberated nations.
• The Allies were grateful to have many new and battle-hardened divisions from France.
• France’s African colonies served as capable manpower supply earlier in the war, while the French Forces of the Interior in metropolitan France provided more capable manpower later on.
• Charles de Gaulle’s inflexible insistence that France be treated as an equal Allied power allowed for the French military to achieve its well-equipped state in 1945.
• The Americans took responsibility for the re-equipment of French forces at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. They agreed to supply eight French infantry divisions and three armored divisions, which was later lowered to eight divisions - five infantry, three armored. The re-equipment program also fully equipped and trained eight French divisions in North Africa, partially outfitted and trained three more in France, furnished equipment for nineteen air squadrons, and carried out an extensive rehabilitation program for the French Navy. They supplied some 1,400 aircraft, 160,000 rifles and carbines, 30,000 machine-guns, 3,000 artillery guns, 5,000 tanks and self-propelled weapons, and 51,000,000 rounds of ammunition.
• French troops were grateful to have the American equipment, but French dependence on American generosity caused some tension or embarrassment with the GIs.
• French officers in Italy used their Ruby pistols until they ran out of ammo; many French troops maintained the iconic Adrian helmet.
• The French never received M1 Garands from the Americans. Therefore, French weaponry like the FM-24 was used to supplement US gear.
• French units formed “outside” the ANFA program did not receive much of the American equipment and had to be equipped by pre-war stocks, new production, captured German and Italian equipment, and whatever could be begged/borrowed/st

Relevant: true Importance: 7

Notes:

• The post dates back to 2010 and was posted on the r/AskCulinary subreddit. It was created by a user that wanted someone working in a high-volume kitchen to explain the brigade system of kitchen management.
• The top comment comes from a user who provides a description of how the brigade system works in their Spanish Tapas place kitchen. The kitchen consisted of a fryer, saute, grill, expo, and deli stations. The expo station was responsible for handling calls and answers for saute and grill stations, soups, and a small number of dishes that the expo station could put out on its own.
• For 90% of the dishes, each station was self-contained, and they had to shout up and down the line whenever someone needed something.
• Another user recommends having a clearheaded, experienced, and vocal person to run the line in a high-volume kitchen. The user further explains how everything flowed through the grill cook, who would call out the steps to be taken by other stations. The other stations would then take the necessary steps and communicate what the next step was. The expediter ensured bread products on the grill were not over or undercooked and kept an eye on the entire line.
• There are 3-4 people working in the kitchen, while the dishwasher is responsible for cleaning and maintaining order in the kitchen. They also help with plating and bringing finished dishes to the window.
• There is a need for anyone calling the shots in the kitchen to be familiar with the dishes, quirks of the grill/flattop/broiler, or flow of the kitchen.
• The post comprises of varied comments about the different methods people use to manage their high-volume kitchens. Some users point out that they rely on computerized POS systems that print different tickets for different stations. Others mention that there is no one-size-fits-all method to manage a high-volume kitchen.

Not used in article

Not used in article

• The post is about finding resources on the structure of the modern French Army, particularly how French companies, regiments, and brigades are organized and any good sources on the French Army from any time period.
• A user recommends checking the Wikipedia article on French Army’s brigades that provides a detailed organization structure. They suggest visiting the French Ministry of Defense/Armed Forces Ministry website for more information on regiments, structure, equipment, etc.; however, it is not the most detailed or the most up-to-date source.
• A user asks how regiments work with so many companies compared to US battalions. They want to know how 5 Infantry companies compare to 3 with a weapons company in the US. Another user provides information on French support platoons, including a mortar group and an AT group. The Mortar group is equipped with a pair of 81mm LLR mortars. The AT group has 2 MMP firing post. The user explains that Brigades have 5 line regiments, 1 artillery, 1 engineering. Infantry regiments are comprised of 5 companies with 3 Infantry, 1 command, and 1 support section.
• Another user explains that for the support platoon, French Army works in combined arms, so you don’t see an “infantry” support platoon; they are equipped with ATGM.
• The user suggests that the French Army should favor more initiative and less oversight at the junior officer level and that there are advantages and disadvantages to both US and French approaches. They explain that the French regiment is mostly there for training, administration, and having “all your guys” at the same spot and the structure is similar to a battalion but bigger, so the support/command/HQ size follows.
• A user acknowledges that infantry regiments tend to be bigger than the artillery regiment, and a lot of non-direct combat units have less manpower than we think, around 800.
• Another user explains that the artillery regiment has 1 command battery, 1 target acquisition & surveillance battery, 3 “surface to surface” batteries, and 1 “surface to air” batteries. The S2S batteries are equipped with either 155mm CAESAR or AUF1 and in some cases the towed TRF1 or 120mm mortars. They explain that a French battery has 8 pieces and not 6 like the US. The surface to air battery is equipped with Mistral missiles.
• A user explains that the structure

Here are the notes based on the text on the webpage:

• The webpage contains an infographic that explains the French Leclerc Tank Task Force system.
• In a comment, a Reddit user states that the SGTIA (Combined Arms Tactical Group) and GTIA (Combined Arms Group) system is an excellent system for sending small combined arms units out on a task.
• The same user observes that the lack of permanence and the single-arm nature of the regiments does make them wonder how the French currently plan on handling LSCO (Large-Scale Combat Operations) - or if that’s just something they don’t consider worth seriously preparing for.
• Another Reddit user comments that “high intensity,” i.e. peer-to-peer has been the focus point of the French Army for a few years now. It is a concern, but no significant restructuring is really needed since, while the regiments are single-arm, the brigades (which would be better suited for LSCO) they’re a part of aren’t. Each brigade has a mission of its own (airborne, mountain, amphibious, armor…) but includes infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers regiments.
• A Reddit user questions the sources used for the infographic.
• Another Reddit user asks what the actual French terms for the task force are.
• An intriguing comment from a Reddit user states that they were watching “Tank Chats” a while back and one of the presenters mentioned that while at a tank show, they decided to look underneath a Leclerc and was then promptly told by a guard nearby not to do that. The user asked what the reason might be, and another Reddit user responded that they were probably trying to hide their ERA (Explosive Reactive Armor) underside. As France never used the Leclerc tanks in combat before, the ERA still remains classified.
• Another Reddit user inquires about the possibility of platoons/sections being commanded by enlisted personnel. They ask if this is common and what ranks the enlisted commanders typically hold.
• One Reddit user praises the infographics.
• Another Reddit user asks OP if they have a collection of these types of infographics, while another user compliments the compilation of the information.

In summary, the webpage contains an infographic that explains the French Leclerc Tank Task Force system, as well as a discussion on the French Army’s brigade system and its limitations in terms of handling large-scale deployments. Moreover, various comments on Reddit provide additional insights into different aspects of the French military.

Not used in article

Notes:

• The post is a question on the rank and promotion system of the French Army of the late Ancien Regime. (5 points)
• The poster also shares an image of a table depicting the promotion system introduced on January 1, 1791, and the older system marked as October 1, 1786.
• The older system seems complex and has peculiarities such as having no rank of colonel and multiple sub-grades for most ranks, some of which are redundant. (1 point with 7 karma)
• One user explains that the oddities of the rank system were due to a two-track promotion system with a fast lane to the highest ranks reserved for the highest nobles and the slow lane for the untitled provincial nobility. (7 karma)
• Both men saw that the privileges accorded to the court nobility – rapid advancement through the junior officer ranks, a virtual monopoly on the ranks of Colonel and above, and the swarm of supernumerary “*a la suite*” positions that offered rank and pay without the need to serve – as being injurious to the morale of the officer corps. (7 karma)
• The post explains that much of the blame for the catastrophic performance of the French army during the Seven Years War was placed on a lack of motivation on the part of the officer corps and that steps were taken to correct the deficiencies within the system. (7 karma)
• These steps included the banning of the purchase of commissions and promotions, the financial administration of each company taken over by the state, and the requirement of proof of four generations of noble lineage in order to become an officer in 1781. (7 karma)
• The post discusses how the ideal officer corps was supposed to be composed of a hereditary military nobility. (7 karma)
• It describes the composition of the ideal officer corps and how the idea of merit differed from our modern conception. (7 karma)
• There is also a brief explanation of how the creation of new ranks accommodated the demands of the Court nobility, and how infantry companies were split into two half-companies. However, it doesn’t directly address the brigade system. (7 karma)

Not used in article

💭  Looking into

Advantages and disadvantages of the French brigade system vs. other military methodologies

💭  Looking into

Overview of the French brigade system